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Abstract	  
	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  began	  to	  publicly	  express	  support	  for	  what	  have	  traditionally	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘capital	  controls’.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  public	  statements,	  the	  IMF	  underwent	  a	  systematic	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  Fund	  policy	  on	  the	  matter,	  and	  published	  an	  official	  view	  on	  the	  economics	  of	  capital	  flows.	  	  In	  this	  view	  the	  IMF	  concluded	  that	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  is	  not	  always	  the	  most	  optimal	  policy	  and	  that	  there	  are	  situations	  where	  capital	  controls—rebranded	  as	  ‘capital	  flow	  management	  measures’—are	  appropriate.	  	  This	  paper	  empirically	  examines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  change	  in	  IMF	  discourse	  on	  these	  matters	  has	  resulted	  in	  significant	  changes	  in	  IMF	  policy	  advice.	  	  To	  answer	  this	  question	  we	  create	  a	  database	  of	  IMF	  Article	  IV	  reports	  and	  examine	  whether	  the	  financial	  crisis	  had	  an	  independent	  impact	  on	  IMF	  support	  for	  capital	  controls.	  	  We	  find	  that	  the	  IMF’s	  level	  of	  support	  for	  capital	  controls	  has	  increased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  as	  the	  vulnerabilities	  associated	  with	  capital	  flows	  accentuate.	  Keywords:	  	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  development	  macroeconomics,	  capital	  flows	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1. Introductory	  Framework	  and	  Literature	  Review	  Sometimes	  financial	  crises	  make	  policy-­‐makers	  stop	  and	  rethink	  whether	  they	  know	  what	  they	  think	  they	  know	  about	  how	  economies	  work	  and	  what	  the	  proper	  economic	  policy	  responses	  should	  be	  to	  prevent	  and	  mitigate	  such	  crises.	  	  Was	  this	  time	  different?	  	  It	  has	  been	  well	  established	  that	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  though	  no	  longer	  wholly	  opposed,	  was	  generally	  skeptical	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  cross-­‐border	  financial	  flows	  from	  the	  1980s	  to	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  (Abdelal,	  2007;	  Chweiroth,	  2009;	  Moschella,	  2010).	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  crisis	  the	  IMF	  surprised	  many	  observers	  by	  openly	  embracing	  capital	  controls	  to	  both	  prevent	  and	  mitigate	  financial	  crises.	  The	  IMF	  supported	  the	  use	  of	  capital	  controls	  on	  inflows	  in	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  such	  as	  Brazil	  and	  South	  Korea.	  	  Most	  surprising	  to	  many	  was	  the	  IMF’s	  strong	  support	  of	  the	  use	  of	  capital	  controls	  on	  outflows	  in	  Iceland	  as	  part	  of	  that	  country’s	  post	  crisis	  stand-­‐by-­‐agreement	  (Sigurgeirsdottir	  and	  Wade,	  2014).	  	  	  A	  burgeoning	  literature	  has	  explained	  the	  role	  the	  crisis	  played	  in	  the	  shift	  of	  discourse	  at	  the	  IMF	  on	  this	  matter	  (Grabel,	  2011;	  Chweiroth,	  2013;	  Gallagher,	  2014).	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  crisis	  played	  an	  independent	  part	  in	  at	  least	  accelerating	  an	  incremental	  level	  of	  ideational	  change	  at	  the	  fund	  on	  this	  issue,	  though	  the	  seeds	  of	  change	  were	  planted	  after	  the	  wave	  of	  crises	  that	  ended	  the	  century.	  	  This	  paper	  takes	  such	  analyses	  one	  step	  further	  by	  analyzing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  changes	  in	  discourse	  related	  to	  the	  crisis	  were	  also	  associated	  with	  changes	  in	  official	  IMF	  advice	  on	  managing	  capital	  flows.	  	  	  A	  strand	  of	  theory	  in	  the	  international	  political	  economy	  literature	  postulates	  that	  during	  episodes	  of	  financial	  crises	  that	  firmly	  held	  ideas	  can	  be	  challenged	  by	  a	  rival	  set	  ideas	  about	  how	  economies	  work	  and	  should	  be	  managed.	  	  Under	  the	  uncertainty	  that	  is	  rife	  in	  such	  episodes,	  certain	  key	  agents	  can	  be	  open	  to	  alternative	  ideas	  that	  help	  manage	  such	  uncertainty.	  	  The	  conduits	  for	  such	  change	  can	  be	  ‘norm	  entrepreneurs’’	  that	  cultivate	  ‘pervasive	  struggles’	  to	  legitimize	  previously	  unaccepted	  views	  (Blyth	  2002;	  Seabrooke	  2007;	  Schmidt	  2008;	  Widmeier	  et	  al	  2007).	  	  	  In	  the	  global	  uncertainty	  following	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  research	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  IMF	  changed	  the	  way	  it	  talked	  about	  global	  capital	  flows	  and	  their	  benefits	  and	  risks.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  1990s	  the	  IMF	  underwent	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  and	  began	  to	  see	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  as	  an	  optimal	  policy	  for	  all	  countries,	  and	  thus	  saw	  capital	  controls	  as	  an	  unadvisable	  policy.	   	   Indeed,	   in	   the	  1990s	  the	   IMF	  went	  so	   far	  as	   to	   introduce	  a	  formal	  change	  to	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  that	  would	  have	  mandated	  open	  capital	  accounts	   for	   its	  membership.	   	  As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   financial	   crises	   of	   the	  1990s,	   and	  actions	   by	   the	   United	   States	   Congress,	   that	   proposal	   did	   not	   come	   to	   fruition.	  	  	  Subsequently,	   the	   IMF	   became	   more	   tolerant	   of	   the	   gradual	   liberalization	   of	   the	  capital	   account	   and	   of	   temporary,	   price-­‐based	   capital	   controls	   as	   a	   last	   resort	   for	  emerging	  market	   and	   developing	   countries	   (Independent	   Evaluation	  Office,	   2005;	  Abdelal,	  2007;	  Chweiroth,	  2009;	  Moschella,	  2010).	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A	   significant	   shift	   in	   mainstream	   economic	   thinking	   regarding	   the	   regulation	   of	  capital	  flows	  occurred	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis	  as	  well.	   	  Mainstream	  economic	  thought	  generally	  saw	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  as	  an	  optimal	  policy	  in	  the	  long	  run	   for	   all	   countries	   and	   saw	   the	   regulation	   of	   capital	   flows	   as	   inherently	  distortionary	   from	   that	   optimum.	   	   Certain	   strands	   of	   economics	   from	   the	  Keynes,	  Minsky,	  and	  Lewis	  traditions	  had	  long	  seen	  the	  regulation	  of	  capital	  as	  necessary	  for	  maintaining	  monetary	  policy	  autonomy,	  preventing	  financial	  fragility,	  and	  as	  levers	  for	  structural	  transformation.	  	  	  These	  perspectives	  had	  fallen	  out	  of	  the	  mainstream	  by	  the	  1980s	  (Gallagher,	  2014).	  Around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  a	  consensus	  among	  mainstream	  began	  to	  emerge	  on	  both	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  econometric	  evidence	  related	  to	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  capital	  flows.	  	  A	  number	  of	  theorists	  began	  to	  question	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  is	  optimal,	  especially	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  information	  externalities.	  	  According	  to	  this	  research,	  externalities	  are	  generated	  by	  capital	  flows	  because	  individual	  investors	  and	  borrowers	  do	  not	  know	  (or	  ignore)	  what	  the	  effects	  of	  their	  financial	  decisions	  will	  be	  on	  the	  level	  of	  financial	  stability	  in	  a	  particular	  nation.	  This	  is	  a	  classic	  market	  failure	  argument	  and	  calls	  for	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  Pigouvian	  tax	  that	  will	  correct	  for	  the	  market	  failure	  and	  make	  markets	  work	  more	  efficiently.	  	  These	  theoretical	  breakthroughs	  were	  further	  substantiated	  given	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  econometric	  analyses	  of	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  find	  no	  rigorous	  link	  between	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  and	  growth	  in	  emerging	  market	  and	  developing	  countries,	  and	  that	  liberalization	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  banking	  crises	  (Jeanne	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  Finally,	  meta-­‐reviews	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  as	  capital	  controls	  found	  that	  capital	  controls	  consistently	  had	  the	  desired	  effects	  of	  their	  policy-­‐makers	  (Magud	  et	  al,	  2011;	  Jeanne	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  An	  authoritative	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  these	  matters	  concluded	  the	  following:	  “The	  international	  community	  should	  not	  seek	  to	  promote	  totally	  free	  trade	  in	  assets—even	  over	  the	  long	  run—because	  (as	  we	  show	  in	  this	  book)	  free	  capital	  mobility	  seems	  to	  have	  little	  benefit	  in	  terms	  of	  long-­‐run	  growth	  and	  because	  there	  is	  a	  good	  case	  to	  be	  made	  for	  prudential	  and	  other	  non-­‐distortive	  capital	  controls.”	  (Jeanne	  et	  al,	  2012,	  5).	  The	  IMF	  took	  an	  even	  larger	  step	  in	  accepting	  gradual	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  and	   the	   use	   of	   capital	   controls	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2008.	  	  First,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   crisis	  was	   associated	  with	   significant	   surges	  and	   sudden	   stops	   in	   cross-­‐border	   capital	   flows	   as	   Figure	   1	   shows,	   there	   was	   a	  sudden	   stop	   in	   capital	   flows	   to	   emerging	   market	   and	   developing	   countries	   as	   a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis—with	  investors	  flocking	  to	  the	  ‘safety’	  of	  industrialized	  markets.	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Figure	  1	  All	  Emerging	  Market:	  Gross	  Capital	  Inflows	  1998-­‐2012	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the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  IMF	  has	  changed	  its	  behavior	  in	  other	  issues.	  	  Vreeland	  (2003),	  Pop	  Ecles	  (2008),	  Thacker	  (2009),	  Bird	  and	  Rowlands	  (2009),	  and	  Presbitero	  and	  Zazzaro	  (2012)	  have	  all	  examined	  the	  quantitative	  determinants	  of	  IMF	  lending	  programs	  in	  different	  settings.	  	  	  There	  is	  also	  one	  article	  that	  empirically	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  IMF	  and	  policy	  on	  capital	  flows.	  	  Joyce	  and	  Noy	  (2008)	  empirically	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  IMF	  country	  programs	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  were	  associated	  with	  policies	  to	  liberalize	  the	  capital	  account.	  	  The	  authors	  do	  indeed	  find	  evidence	  that	  IMF	  programs	  were	  correlated	  with	  capital	  account	  liberalization.	  	  Roy	  and	  Ramos	  (2012)	  examine	  Article	  IV	  reports	  to	  identify	  whether	  the	  IMF	  has	  changed	  its	  policy	  advice	  after	  the	  crisis.	  	  For	  their	  paper	  they	  read	  26	  reports	  in	  2010	  and	  did	  not	  see	  much	  of	  a	  change	  in	  IMF	  behavior.	  	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  Joyce	  and	  Noy,	  	  our	  paper	  is	  the	  first	  to	  our	  knowledge	  that	  econometrically	  examines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  IMF	  has	  demonstrably	  changed	  its	  advisory	  behavior	  as	  manifest	  in	  official	  Article	  IV	  reports	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  
2. 	  Data	  and	  Methodology	  The	  specific	  research	  questions	  for	  this	  paper	  are:	  To	  what	  extent	  has	  the	  IMF	  changed	  the	  way	  it	  views	  capital	  flows,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  has	  the	  IMF	  increased	  its	  level	  of	  support	  for	  capital	  controls	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis?	  This	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  describes	  the	  mechanics	  of	  the	  database	  that	  was	  created	  to	  answer	  our	  research	  question	  and	  outlines	  the	  econometric	  model	  and	  methodology	  for	  the	  research	  as	  a	  whole.	  
2.1	  Database	  Our	  study	  is	  based	  on	  a	  unique	  dataset	  created	  from	  IMF	  annual	  Article	  IV	  reports	  since	  1998.	  We	  built	   a	  database	   focusing	  on	  capital	   flow	  management	  and	   related	  policies	   for	   31	   emerging	   markets	   covering	   Asia,	   Latin	   America	   and	   Caribbean,	  Europe	   and	   Africa.	   This	   database	   includes	   coding	   IMF	   Article	   IV	   Consultation	  Reports	   and	   Public	   Information	   Notice	   well	   as	   collecting	   country-­‐specific	  macroeconomic	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  database	  (IMF,	  2013;	  World	  Bank,	  2014).	  	  Our	  coding	  method	  is	  derived	  from	  a	  2005	  IMF	  Evaluation	  Report	  prepared	  by	  the	  Independent	   Evaluation	   Office	   titled	   The	   IMF's	   Approach	   to	   Capital	   Account	  
Liberalization	  (IMF,	  2005).	  In	  that	  report,	  through	  in	  a	  more	  qualitative	  manner	  and	  with	   a	   smaller	   set	   of	   countries,	   the	   IMF’s	   Independent	   Evaluation	   Office	   (IEO)	  assessed	   the	   level	   of	   IMF	   support	   for	   capital	   account	   liberalization	   and	   capital	  controls	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crises	   in	  the	  1990s.	   	   Juxtaposed	  with	  the	  new	  data	  we	  derive	  from	  IMF	  Article	  IV	  reports,	  we	  include	  macroeconomic	  data	  such	  as	  current	   account	   balance,	   domestic	   credit	   of	   the	   banking	   sector	   and	   external	   debt	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payments.	   Overall,	   our	   database	   includes	   528	   observations	   of	   33	   countries	   in	   16	  years	  (1998-­‐2013).	  
2.1.1	  Coding	  Criteria	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  coding	  process	  and	  the	  coding	  manual	  is	  in	  the	  online	  appendix.	  For	   each	   Article	   IV	   report,	   we	   first	   code	   the	   IMF	   initial	   diagnosis	   by	   examining	  whether	  the	  IMF	  deems	  capital	  flows	  as	  an	  area	  of	  concern	  for	  a	  country	  undergoing	  an	  Article	  IV	  consultation.	  Key	  words	  were	  searched	  and	  read	  for	  were	  those	  such	  as	  ‘capital	   flow	  measures,’	   ‘capital	   controls,’	   ‘financial	   stability,’	   ‘surge,’	   ‘sudden	  stop,’	  ‘unremunerated	   reserve	   requirement,’	   ‘capital	   account	   deficit,’	   ‘inflows/outflows,’	  ‘exchange	  rate	  risk,’	  ‘debts	  denominated	  in	  foreign	  currency,’	  and	  others.	  Keywords	   of	   a	   capital	   flow	   issues	   include	   ‘external	   shock,’	   ‘external	   instability,’	  ‘adverse	  shocks	  related	  to	  global	  stress,’	   ‘adverse	  spillovers	  arising	  from	  the	  global	  turmoil,’	   ‘contagion,’	   ‘foreign	   exchange	   pressures,’	   ‘rising	   external	   imbalance’,	  ‘external	  financial	  environment,’	  ‘balance	  of	  payment	  pressure.’	  Secondly,	  we	  code	  the	  IMF’s	  policy	  recommendations	  to	  remedy	  concerns	  related	  to	  capital	  flows.	  	  We	  code	  each	  policy	  recommendation	  separately,	  corresponding	  with	  the	  measures	  coded	  by	  the	  IEO	  in	  their	  2005:	  Tighten	  Fiscal	  Policy,	  Exchange	  Rate	  Flexibility,	   Sterilization/Intervention	   in	   the	   currency	  market,	  Trade	  Liberalization,	  Tighten	  Prudential	  Regulation,	  Capital	  Flows	  Management/Capital	  Controls.	  	  	  Finally,	   if	   the	   IMF	   has	   a	   policy	   recommendation	   with	   respect	   to	   Capital	   Flow	  Management	  measures	   or	   capital	   controls,	  we	   code	   the	   IMF’s	   level	   of	   support	   for	  such	  measures.	   A	   common	   response	   to	  managing	   capital	   flows	   is	   to	   tighten	   fiscal	  policy.	   Any	   recommendation	   to	   engage	   in	   fiscal	   tightening	   is	   in	   response	   to	  macroeconomic	   factors.	   Key	  words	   in	   tightening	   fiscal	   policy	   include	   overheating	  economy,	  risk,	  ease	  burden	  on	  monetary	  policy,	  cushion	  to	  weather	  shock,	  response	  to	  a	  possible	  surge	  in	  capital	  inflows,	  inflation	  resulting	  from	  an	  external	  situation.	  	  	  Exchange	  rate	  flexibility	  is	  also	  advocated	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  others	  as	  tool	  to	  temper	  swings	   in	   capital	   flows.	   	   A	   flexible	   exchange	   rate	   can	   be	   a	   shock	   absorber	   in	   the	  event	  of	  capital	  inflow	  surge.	  For	  sterilization	  /intervention	  in	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  markets,	   we	   read	   for	   endorsements	   of	   a	   reserve	   build-­‐up,	   higher	   reserve	   levels	  would	   help	   guard	   against	   capital	   account	   shocks,	   intervention	   in	   FX	   markets	   to	  smooth	  volatility	  and	  enhance	  liquidity,	  reserve	  accumulation,	  purchases	  of	  foreign	  exchange.	  	  Tighten	  macro	  prudential	  policy	  key	  words	  are	  capital	  requirements	  for	  banks,	  bank	  soundness,	   systemic	   risk,	   Basel	   III,	   improve	   supervision	   and	   regulation,	   guard	  against	  risk,	  measures	   to	  prevent	   liquidity	  crisis	   in	  banking	  system,	  raising	  capital	  adequacy	   ratio,	   reinforcing	   financial	   soundness,	   promoting	   financial	   sector	  deepening.	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We	  also	  code	  IMF	  recommendations	  with	  respect	  to	  CFMs.	  The	  key	  words	  includes:	  capital	  controls2,	  capital	  flow	  measures,	  CFM,	  unremunerated	  reserve	  requirement,	  impact	  of	  capital	  controls/	  ineffectiveness,	  capital	  account	  regulation	  of	  a	  prudential	  nature,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  There	  are	  numerous	  kinds	  of	  CFMs	  or	  capital	  controls,	  such	  as	  taxes	  on	  the	  inflow	  or	  outflow	   of	   capital,	   quantitative	   measures	   on	   the	   repatriation	   of	   portfolio	  investments,	   exit	   levies,;	   prohibition	   of	   foreign	   purchase	   or	   holding	   of	   domestic	  assets;	  requirements	   to	  obtain	  administrative	  permission	   for	  a	   foreign	  bond	   issue;	  minimum	  maturity	  period	  for	  foreign	  bond	  issues;;	  taxes	  on	  purchases	  of	  domestic	  assets	   by	   foreigners	   or	   on	   investment	   income	   earned	   by	   foreigners;	   reserve	  requirements	  on	  deposits	  held	  by	  foreigners	  and	  others	  (see	  Gallagher,	  2014).	  Level	   of	   support	   for	   capital	   controls	   are	   divided	   into	   four	   groups:	   not	   supportive	  (phase	  out	  controls,	  controls	  are	  ineffective,	  drawbacks,	  elimination	  of	  controls	  as	  a	  positive	   step,	   negative	   effects	   of	   capital	   controls),	   not	   mentioned,	   partially	  supportive	   (management	   of	   temporary	   surge,	   could	   be	   an	   option,	   part	   of	   a	  transitory	   response)	   and	   fully	   supportive.	   	   We	   code	   these	   as	   -­‐1,	   0,	   1,	   and	   2,	  respectively.	  	  Figure	  1	  outlines	  our	  coding	  methodology	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  If	  controls	  are	  mentioned	  in	  the	  context	  of	  FDI,	  we	  still	  code	  it	  as	  a	  mention	  and	  add	  comments	  in	  separate	  column,	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Figure	  2	  Coding	  Process	  	  
	  	   	  
Reconciliation	  and	  Merge:	  Coders	  discuss	  discrepancies	  and	  make	  correponding	  modimications	  to	  create	  a	  minal	  dataset	  
Final	  Coding:	  coders	  code	  independently	  and	  cover	  the	  full	  set	  of	  article	  IVs.	  
Reliability	  check	  and	  Oinal	  codebook	  revision:	  coders	  discuss	  issues	  case	  by	  case	  and	  point	  out	  continuing	  coding	  discrepancies.	  Coding	  manual	  is	  modimied	  to	  account	  for	  discrepancies.	  
Entire	  set:	  team	  of	  coders	  is	  assigned	  countries	  in	  different	  categories.	  
Codebook	  ModiOication:	  discuss	  and	  modify	  problematic	  codes.	  Modimied	  code	  manual	  is	  given	  back	  to	  coders.	  
Bias	  Control	  Test:	  inter	  coder	  statistics	  are	  calculated	  on	  the	  coding	  sample.	  Compare	  results	  and	  test	  reliability.	  
Random	  Sample	  Coding:	  given	  the	  same	  coding	  sample	  from	  database	  ,	  coders	  code	  independently.	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2.1.2	  Tests	  on	  Bias	  Control	  To	   control	   the	   coding	   bias	   among	   different	   coders,	   we	   apply	   the	   kappa	   and	  concordance	   methods.	   These	   methods	   are	   widely	   used	   in	   survey	   and	   coding	  literature,	  especially	  medical	  science.	  The	  estimators	  are	  an	  inter-­‐coder	  agreement	  measure	   describing	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   coding.	   What	   all	   inter-­‐coder	   agreement	  measures	  do	  is	  adjust	  for	  this	  level	  of	  chance	  in	  some	  way.	  The	  standards	  for	  what	  suffices	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  acceptable	  'threshold'	  (e.g.	  60%	  inter-­‐coder	  agreement)	  are	  well	  defined	  based	  on	  specific	  cases	  and	  not	  fixed.	  The	  higher	  the	  agreement	  estimators	  are,	  the	  more	  consistent	  the	  coding	  is.	  They	  give	  feedback	  on	  whether	  and	  how	  to	  adjust	  the	  coding.	  In	  addition,	  this	  helps	  the	  team	  of	  coders	  to	  be	  on	  the	  same	  page	  and	  make	  precise	  quantitative	  coding.	  The	  process	  of	   coding	  at	   its	   initial	   stage	   is	  an	   iterative	  process.	  After	  adapting	   the	  codebook	   and	   communicating	   together	   as	   a	   group	   to	   perfect	   the	   procedure	   of	  coding,	  we	  reach	  an	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  scores	  of	  88.7%.	  	  To	  measure	   the	   inter	  coder	  variation	  so	   that	   two	  or	  more	   independent	  coders	  are	  evaluation	  the	  same	  thing,	  we	  use	  kappa	  statistic	  as	  a	  numerical	  rating	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  coding	  is	  consistent.	  First,	  five	  coders	  are	  coding	  independently	  on	  the	  same	  country-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Columbia	  1998-­‐2012	  Article	  IVs.	  Each	  coder	  codes	  15	  observations	  on	   policy	   indicators	   and	   capital	   control	   measures.	   Second,	   coders	   discuss	   the	  differences	   and	   compare	   each	   coding	   results	   with	   the	   corresponding	   sources.	  Disagreements	  are	   settled	  on	  specific	   issues	  and	   the	   team	  comes	  up	  with	   the	   first	  draft	  of	  coding	  manual.	  Then,	  coders	  are	  re-­‐coding	  again	  based	  on	  the	  manual.	  After	  several	  rounds	  of	  discussion	  and	  review,	  the	  coding	  results	  are	  pooled	  together	  and	  kappa	  statistics	  are	  calculated.	  The	  calculation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  how	  much	  agreement	  is	  actually	  present	   compared	   to	   how	   much	   agreement	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   present	   by	  chance	   alone.	   Kappa	   is	   a	   measure	   of	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   observed	   and	  expected	  agreement,	  standardized	  to	  lie	  on	  a	  -­‐1	  to	  1	  scale.	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Table	  1:	  Inter	  Coder	  Variation	  on	  Level	  of	  Supports	  in	  Capital	  Controls	  Outcome	   Kappa	  Statistic	   Z	   Prob>Z	  0	   0.5076	   5.31	   0.0000	  1	   0.3647	   3.45	   0.0003	  2	   0.4663	   6.08	   0.0000	  3	   0.0119	   0.16	   0.5617	  Combined	   0.4280	   6.58	   0.0000	  	  Table	  1	  indicates	  the	  average	  outcomes	  obtained	  from	  the	  pool	  of	  five	  coders.	  Based	  on	  the	  general	  criteria	  as	  shown	  in	  Graph	  1,	  the	  kappa	  statistic	  scores	  for	  0	  and	  2	  are	  moderate,	   1	   is	   fair	   while	   3	   is	   poor.	   The	   kappa-­‐statistic	   measure	   of	   agreement	   is	  scaled	   to	   be	   0	   when	   the	   amount	   of	   agreement	   is	   what	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   be	  observed	  by	  chance	  and	  1	  when	  there	  is	  perfect	  agreement.	  	  
Figure	  3	  Interpretation	  of	  Kappa	  
	  	  The	   estimated	  kappa	   itself	   could	  be	  due	   to	   chance.	  The	  P	   value	   and	   z	   statistics	   of	  kappa	  reports	  the	  variance	  of	  kappa.	  We	  eliminate	  the	  case	  of	  estimated	  kappa	  due	  to	  chance	  with	  statistically	  significant	  kappa	  above	  0.	  	  To	  evaluate	  the	  quality	  of	  coders’	  coding,	  we	  also	  calculate	  the	  correlation	  and	  apply	  the	   concord	   commend	   in	   STATA	   for	   any	   two	   coders.	   Concordance	   correlation	  coefficient	   (Lin,	   1989,	   2000)	   reflects	   a	   statistic	   comparison	   between	   different	  coders.	   This	   helps	   to	   find	   the	   difference	   between	   two	   coders.	  Here	  we	   report	   the	  correlation	  coefficient	  of	  5	  coders	  on	  coding	  Columbia	  Article	  IVs	  in	  Table	  2.	  We	  find	  coder1	   and	   coder	   3	   has	   the	   highest	   correlation	   while	   there	   are	   disagreements	  among	  coder	  2	  and	  coder	  4.	  Coder	  2’s	  coding	  has	  the	  relative	  poor	  quality	  and	  the	  group	  discussion	  solves	  the	  disagreement	  term	  by	  term.	  	  	  	  	  
Almost	  Perfect	  1.0	  Substantial	  	  	  	  .80	  Moderate	  .60	  Fair	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .40	  Slight	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .20	  Poor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.0	  Agreement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kappa:	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Table	  2:	  Correlation	  between	  raters	  on	  all	  coding	  observations	  Correlation	   Coder0	   Coder1	   Coder2	   Coder3	   Coder4	  Coder0	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	  Coder	  1	   0.6035	   1.0000	   	   	   	  Coder	  2	   0.3671	   0.1364	   1.0000	   	   	  Coder	  3	   0.7493	   0.8870	   0.3155	   1.0000	   	  Coder	  4	   0.6187	   0.5581	   0.1527	   0.6954	   1.0000	  	  After	   recoding	   the	   disagreement	   term	   together,	   we	   calculate	   the	   concordance	  correlation	   between	   coders	   again.	   The	   reason	   to	   introduce	   Lin’s	   concordance	  method	  is	  that	   it	   is	  robust	  on	  as	   few	  as	  10	  pairs	  of	  data,	  which	   is	  more	  suitable	   in	  our	  coding	  situation.	  The	  results	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  3.	  We	  reach	  an	  agreement	  with	   concordance	   correlation	   coefficient	   (>0.8:	   substantial;	   >0.6:	   moderate).	   The	  average	  of	  differences	  between	  coders	  is	  controlled	  under	  0.2.	  Tests	  on	  bias	  control	  are	  helpful	   in	  amendments	  and	  give	  suggestions	  on	  revising.	  It’s	   important	  to	  detect	  the	  difference	  before	  generating	  to	  other	  countries.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   case	   study	   also	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   coding	   process.	   It	  provides	  efficient	  coding	  process.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  final	  coding	  manual	  passes	  the	  moderate	  level	  of	  inter	  coder	  agreement	  statistically.	  Our	  coding	  results	  among	  all	  countries	  across	  time	  are	  consistent	  and	  the	   team	   has	   the	   unified	   criteria	   on	   quantifying	   the	   policy	   factors.	   The	   level	   of	  supports	  on	  capital	  controls	  are	  coded	  neutrally	  according	  the	  reports	  sentence	  by	  sentence.	  The	  evaluation	  from	  5	  coders	  is	  on	  the	  same	  level	  statistically,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  variation	  by	  chance.	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Table	  3:	  Concordance	  Correlation	  Coefficient	  Comparison	  Pairs	   Concordance	   Correlation	  Coefficient	   Difference	  Statistics	  Coder	  #	   Coder	  #	   rho_c	   SE(rho_c)	   95%	  CI	  (asymptotic)	   Average	   Correlation	  	  btw	   difference	   &	  mean	  rater1	   rater0	   0.622	   0.156	   [0.316,	  0.929]	   -­‐0.059	   -­‐0.139	  rater1	   rater2	   0.496	   0.240	   [0.276,	  0.667]	   -­‐0.176	   -­‐0.093	  rater1	   rater3	   0.872	   0.065	   [0.744,	  1.000]	   0.133	   0.019	  rater1	   rater4	   0.657	   0.167	   [0.229,	  0.885]	   -­‐0.118	   -­‐0.318	  	  After	  several	  rounds	  of	  kappa	  and	  concordance	  tests,	  we	  improve	  the	  coding	  manual	  and	  come	  up	  with	  a	  consistent	  result.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  coding,	  we	  go	  through	  all	  the	  coding	   results	   to	   check	   and	   correct	   for	   consistency,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  structural	  relationship	  between	  each	  element	  of	  every	  observations.	  We	  also	  fill	  0	  to	  the	  blank	  cells	  to	  complete	  the	  data	  set	  based	  on	  the	  related	  report	  reference.	  
2.2	  Econometric	  Methodology	  Given	   the	   dataset	   coded	   from	   Article	   IV	   Reports,	   we	   apply	   OLS	   regression	   in	   a	  reduced-­‐form	   econometric	   model	   to	   examine	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   IMF	   has	  changed	   its	   diagnoses	   of	   the	   role	   of	   capital	   flows	   and	   whether	   the	   IMF	   has	  significantly	  changed	  its	  level	  of	  support	  for	  CFMs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis.	  Thus,	  our	  model	  is	  built	  to	  analyze	  whether	  the	  IMF’s	  view	  on	  capital	  flows	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  financial	  crises	  and	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  economy.	  It	  also	  takes	  the	  country	  fixed	  effect	   into	  consideration	  and	  runs	  the	  robust	  regression	  on	  the	  panel	  dataset	   from	  2000	  to	  2013.	  	  The	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  the	  time	  period	  after	  2000	  in	  the	  regressions	  are:	  on	  one	  hand,	  IMF	  policy	  response	  to	  capital	  flows	  for	  the	  1998-­‐2000	  periods	  is	  influenced	  by	   the	   Asian	   Financial	   Crises;	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   during	   the	   1998-­‐2000	   periods,	  most	  of	  the	  data	  is	  based	  on	  Public	  Information	  Notice	  while	  after	  2000	  most	  are	  full	  Article	  IV	  reports.	  Thus,	  to	  have	  a	  more	  reliable	  data	  information	  pre	  and	  post	  2008	  Financial	  Crises,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  choose	  the	  analysis	  period	  after	  2000.	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2.2.1	  Model	  Equations	  The	  research	  question	   is	   to	  examine	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	   IMF	  policy	  advice	  on	  capital	  flows	  after	  the	  financial	  crises.	  In	  other	  words,	  did	  the	  2008	  global	  financial	  crises	  change	  the	  IMF	  initial	  diagnosis	  of	  capital	  flows	  issues	  for	  emerging	  markets?	  Are	   the	   Capital	   Flow	  Management	  measures	  mentioned	  more	   frequently	   after	   the	  crises	   happened?	   If	   the	   emerging	   market	   has	   a	   capital	   flow	   issue,	   how	   does	   the	  IMF’s	  level	  of	  support	  for	  CFMs	  vary?	  	  	  Based	  on	  these	  research	  questions,	  the	  regression	  models	  are	  built	  on	  the	  following	  equations	  in	  the	  reduced	  forms:	  𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠!" = 𝛼!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠! + 𝛾!"𝑋!" + 𝜖!"  	  𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝐹𝑀!" = 𝛼!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠! + 𝛾!"𝑋!" + 𝜖!"  	  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡!" = 𝛼!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠! + 𝛾!"𝑋!" + 𝜖!"	  𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠!"	  is	  coded	  from	  the	  Article	  IV	  report	  of	  country	  𝑖	  at	  year	  𝑡	  on	  whether	  there	   is	   a	   mentioned	   issue	   of	   capital	   flows.	  𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝐹𝑀!" 	  is	   coded	   on	   the	  appearance	   of	   CFMs	   after	   there	   is	   an	   initial	   diagnosis	   from	   the	  report.  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡!"	  measures	   quantitatively	   the	   attitude	   of	   IMF	   towards	   the	  CFM	   policies.	  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠! 	  is	   the	   dummy	   variable	   which	   takes	   1	   after	   2008	   and	   0	  otherwise.	  	  𝑋!"	  is	   the	  macroeconomic	   fundamentals	   that	  measures	   the	   capital	   vulnerability	   of	  the	   emerging	  markets.	   Since	   different	   emerging	  markets	   have	   different	   economic	  situations,	  we	   include	  a	   list	  of	  macro	   fundamental	  measures	  as	   the	   fixed	  effects	   in	  the	   econometric	   regression.	   Our	   selection	   of	   macro	   variables	   is	   based	   on	   the	  Economist	   2013	   Capital	   Freeze	   Index	   (Economist,	   2013).	   We	   make	   a	   modified	  selection	  of	  the	  variables	  and	  pick	  first	  three	  key	  elements:	  current-­‐account	  balance	  as	  %	  of	  GDP	  (CAB),	  short-­‐term	  gross	  external	  debt	  plus	  external	  debt	  payments	  as	  %	  of	  foreign-­‐exchange	  reserves	  (EDP),	  and	  domestic	  banking-­‐sector	  credit	  as	  %	  of	  GDP	  (DBC).	  	  Current-­‐account	  balance	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  value	  of	  imports	  of	  goods	  and	  services	   plus	   net	   returns	   on	   investments	   abroad,	   minus	   the	   value	   of	   exports	   of	  goods	  and	  services.	  When	  a	  country's	  current	  account	  balance	  is	  positive	  (surplus),	  the	   country	   is	   a	   net	   lender	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world.	   When	   a	   country's	   current	  account	   balance	   is	   negative	   (deficit),	   the	   country	   is	   a	   net	   borrower,	   making	   the	  domestic	  economy	  more	  vulnerable	  and	  dependable	  on	  the	  global	  economy.	  For	  example,	  South	  Africa’s	  current	  account	  deficit	   is	  high	  relative	   to	   that	  of	  other	  EMEs	  and	  is	  financed	  by	  relatively	  volatile	  capital	  inflows.	  Foreign	  direct	  investment	  has	   typically	   been	   smaller	   than	   in	   other	   emerging	  markets,	   averaging	   just	   over	   1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  the	  past	  ten	  years	  compared	  to	  around	  3	  percent	  of	  GDP	  for	  the	  median	   of	   EMEs.	   Instead,	   South	   Africa	   has	   been	   more	   reliant	   on	   portfolio	   flows,	  which	   are	   volatile	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	   EMEs.	   There	   are,	   nevertheless,	   other	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important	  mitigating	  factors.	  External	  debt	  is	  low	  (26	  percent	  of	  GDP	  at	  end-­‐2008),	  over	   40	   percent	   of	   which	   is	   denominated	   in	   rand.	   Banks,	   corporations,	   and	  households	   have	   limited	   foreign	   currency	   balance	   sheet	   exposure.	   Capital	   inflows	  are	  predominantly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  equity,	  and	  hence	  denominated	  in	  rand,	  while	  the	  exchange	   rate	   floats.	   Should	   capital	   outflows	   reemerge,	   foreign	   investors	   would	  share	   the	   adjustment	   burden—as	   they	   did	   in	   late	   2008	   when	   the	   stock	   market	  declined	  and	  the	  rand	  depreciated	  sharply.	  External	   debt	   is	   that	   part	   of	   the	   total	   debt	   in	   a	   country	   that	   is	   owed	   to	   creditors	  outside	   the	   country.	   The	   more	   debt	   the	   country	   owes	   the	   outside	   markets,	   the	  higher	  risk	  the	  economy	  bears	  and	  the	  less	  reliable	  the	  economy	  is.	  Domestic	  credit	  provided	   by	   the	   financial	   sector	   includes	   all	   credit	   to	   various	   sectors	   on	   a	   gross	  basis.	  The	  banking	  sector	  includes	  monetary	  authorities	  and	  deposit	  money	  banks,	  as	  well	   as	   other	   banking	   institutions	  where	   data	   are	   available.	   Examples	   of	   other	  banking	   institutions	   are	   savings	   and	  mortgage	   loan	   institutions	   and	   building	   and	  loan	  associations.	  It’s	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  health	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  highly	  related	  with	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  capital	  markets.	  Here	   we	   first	   use	   current	   account	   balance,	   domestic	   banking-­‐sector	   credit,	   and	  external	  debt	  payment	  separately.	  Second,	  we	  generate	  a	  composite	  of	   these	  three	  components	  called	  Capital	  Vulnerability	  Measure	  (CVM)	  following	  the	  rule	  of	  Capital	  Freeze	   Index	   (CFI).	   Then	   use	   CVM	   as	   one	   single	   independent	   variable	   in	   our	  regressions.	  Third,	  we	  add	  the	  multiplication	  term	  of	  the	  control	  variables	  and	  the	  crises	  dummy	  in	  the	  regression.	  This	  aims	  at	  investigating	  the	  response	  reasons	  of	  the	  IMF	  changes	  after	  the	  crises.	  The	  regression	  equation	  is	  𝑌!" = 𝛼!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠! + 𝛾!"𝑋!" + 𝛿!"𝑋!" ∙ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠! + 𝜖!"	  Where	  𝑌!"	  stands	   for	   capital	   flow	   diagnosis,	   CFM	   mention	   or	   support	   for	   capital	  controls.	  𝛿!" 	  measures	   how	   likely	   IMF	   is	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   specific	   economic	  indicator  𝑋!"	  with	  𝑌!"	  after	  the	  2008	  crises.	  	  The	  reason	  we	  exclude	  financial	  openness	  (Chin	  and	  Ito,	  2008)	  in	  our	  measure	  CVM	  is	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   co-­‐linearity	   between	   CAB/EDP	   and	   financial	   openness.	   As	   a	  measure	  of	   financial	  openness,	  Chin-­‐Ito	   index	   is	   a	   summary	  of	   IMF’s	  questions	  on	  countries	  about	  their	  capital	  accounts	  which	  includes	  the	  current	  account	  balance	  of	  the	   country	   and	  other	   related	   variables.	  Without	   loss	   of	   generality,	  we	   also	   adopt	  the	   Chinn-­‐Ito	   capital	   openness	   index	   separately	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   the	   economy’s	  capital	  openness	  to	  see	  the	  impacts	  on	  IMF’s	  institutional	  view.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  we	  run	  the	  regression	  for	  different	  regions	  separately.	  We	  divide	  the	  emerging	  markets	  into	  four	  groups:	  emerging	  Asia,	  emerging	  Latin	  America	  and	  Caribbean,	   emerging	   Europe	   and	   emerging	   others.	   Cross-­‐border	   capital	   flows	   are	  easier	   and	   more	   frequent	   inside	   the	   group	   than	   between	   groups.	   This	   region	  separation	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  regional	  effects	  in	  capital	  flow	  liberalization.	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2.2.2	  Expected	  Results	  The	  model	   is	   to	   test	  whether	   the	   crises	   had	   an	   effect	   on	   IMF	   advice	   to	   emerging	  markets.	  If	  the	  IMF	  had	  changed	  its	  advice	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis	  we	  would	  expect	  to	   observe	   more	   diagnoses	   on	   capital	   flow	   issues	   after	   2008	   and	   IMF’s	   attitudes	  towards	   CFMs	   are	  more	   supportive	   than	   before.	   The	   2008	   global	   financial	   crises	  have	   a	   tremendous	   influence	   on	   the	   emerging	   markets,	   especially	   for	   the	   cross-­‐border	   capital	   flows.	   IMF’s	   change	   in	   CFM	   advice	   will	   result	   in	   significant	   policy	  changes	  in	  the	  developing	  countries.	  Our	  research	  results	  are	  expected	  to	  give	  solid	  quantitative	  evidence	  on	  the	  IMF	  policy	  shifts	  and	  institutional	  view	  switches.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  Crises	  measures	  not	  only	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  changes	  but	  also	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect.	  We	  test	  on	  whether	  it’s	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  and	  interpret	   as	   a	   shift	   of	   regime	   after	   the	   crises.	   A	   comparison	   between	  whether	   to	  include	   the	   macro	   fundamentals	   is	   helpful	   in	   understanding	   these	   changes	   and	  seeking	   the	   underlying	   mechanism	   which	   causes	   these	   changes.	   In	   addition,	   the	  decision	   on	   the	   choice	   of	   macroeconomic	   variables	   shed	   light	   on	   how	   different	  channels	   interrupt	  with	  each	  other	  and	  which	  part	  affects	   the	  cross-­‐border	  capital	  flows	  more	  significantly.	  Controlling	   for	   the	  vulnerability	  of	   the	  economy	  improves	  the	   fitness	  of	   the	  model	  though	   there	   is	   a	   loss	   on	   the	   number	   of	   observations.	   The	   more	   vulnerable	   the	  emerging	  market	  is	  (the	  larger	  the	  capital	   freeze	  index),	  we	  would	  expect	  a	  higher	  chance	   to	   be	   diagnosed	   of	   capital	   flow	   issues	   initially,	   the	   less	   likely	   there	   is	   a	  mention	  of	  CFM	  due	  to	  the	  instability	  of	  economy.	  Otherwise,	  the	  coefficients	  of	  CVM	  are	  insignificantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  The	  R-­‐square	  indicates	  the	  goodness	  to	  fit	  of	  the	   econometric	  model.	  Due	   to	   the	   small	   size	   of	   the	   dataset	   as	  well	   as	   that	   crises	  might	  not	  be	  the	  major	  reason	  for	  IMF’s	  change	  in	  the	  capital	  flow	  issue;	  we	  might	  expect	  a	  small	  R-­‐square.	  The	  regression	  results	  will	  give	  useful	  suggestions	  to	  analyze	  the	  IMF’s	  institutional	  view	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   capital	   flow	   liberalization	   policy,	   taking	   the	   economy	  vulnerability	   index	   into	   account.	   Volatile	   international	   capital	   flows	   has	   cross-­‐border	   financial	   shocks	   which	   influenced	   the	   boom-­‐and-­‐bust	   cycle	   as	   well	   as	  domestic	   banking	   credit.	   It’s	   necessary	   to	   keep	   a	   consistent	   record	   of	   the	   capital	  flow	   management	   policies	   and	   learn	   from	   the	   history	   lessons	   after	   the	   financial	  crises.	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3.	  	  Results	  
3.1	  Summary	  Statistics	  We	  present	  summary	  statistics	   for	  the	  dataset	  as	  a	   flow	  chart	   in	   figure	  4.	  Figure	  5	  presents	  summary	  statistics	  for	  the	  key	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Figure	  6	  and	  7	   demonstrate	   the	   level	   of	   supports	   through	   a	   breakdown	   by	   region	   and	   crises	  event.	  	  An	   important	   issue	   is	   the	  representativeness	  of	   the	  sample.	  We	  adopt	   the	  country	  list	  posted	  by	  IMF	  authority	  and	  compare	  our	  coding	  statistics	  with	  the	  IMF	  dataset3	  between	  1998	  and	  2000.	  Our	  dataset	  mirrors	  with	  their	  summary	  table	  by	  90%.	  The	  results	   show	   that	   our	   sample	   is	   fairly	   representative	   in	   terms	   of	   all	   dimensions	  (country,	  region	  and	  coding	  criteria).	  
3.1.1	  Flow	  Chart	  
Figure	  4	  Summary	  statistics	  of	  coding	  on	  capital	  flows	  
	  Among	   all	   320	   available	   observation	   of	   IMF	   initial	   diagnosis	   during	   2001-­‐2013,	  75.6%	  of	  Article	   IV	  reports	  mentioned	  capital	   flows	  as	  an	   issue	  of	   concern	   for	   the	  country.	  Besides,	  CFMs	  are	  a	  major	  suggestion	  as	  40.5%	  of	  the	  IMF	  initial	  diagnosis.	  Though	  capital	  flow	  management	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  issue,	  it	  often	  comes	  along	  with	  macro	   prudential	   policies	   and	   sterilization/intervention	   in	   foreign	   exchange	  markets.	   Therefore,	   CFM	   not	   mentioned	   for	   a	   diagnosis	   is	   not	   equivalent	   to	   the	  CFM’s	   ineffectiveness	   but	   other	   policies	   alone	   can	   work	   out	   during	   the	   current	  period.	  With	  a	  mention	  of	  CFM,	  61	  out	  of	  98	  cases	  gain	  supportive	  advice	  from	  the	  IMF	  with	  3	  special	  cases	  of	   fully	  support.	  There	  are	  only	  8	  neutral	  cases	   in	   level	  of	  support,	  which	  indicates	  IMF’s	  CFM	  policies	  usually	  come	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  either	  supportive	  or	   not	   supportive.	   It’s	   of	   interest	   to	   see	   the	   distribution	   of	   level	   of	   support	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  2012	  IMF	  new	  institutional	  view,	  Chapter	  4,	  Table	  2	  and	  Table	  3.	  
IMF	  initial	  diagnosis	   • 78	  obs	  coded	  0	  as	  capital	  mlows	  not	  an	  issue.	  • 242	  obs	  coded	  1	  as	  capital	  mlows	  mentioned.	  
Mention	  of	  CFMs	   • Among	  242	  diagnosis,	  144	  obs	  have	  no	  CFM	  mention.	  • 98	  out	  of	  242	  have	  CFMs	  mentioned	  literally.	  
Level	  of	  Support	   • Among	  98	  CFM	  cases,	  29	  (30%)	  are	  coded	  not	  supportive.	  • 58	  (60%)	  are	  partially	  supportive.	  • 8	  neutral	  cases	  and	  3	  fully	  supportive.	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different	  years.	  The	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  level	  of	  support	  are	  signals	  of	  IMF’s	  policy	   switches	   therefore	   help	   understand	   the	   global	   evolvement	   of	   capital	   flow	  liberalization.	  
Figure	  5	  Proportions	  of	  level	  of	  support	  in	  terms	  of	  total	  mention	  of	  CFMs	  
	  From	  Figure	  5,	  we	  can	  summarize	  that:	  
• Mention	   of	   CFMs	   (the	   total	   number	   of	   all	   IMF	   initial	   diagnosis	   with	   CFM	  mentioned)	  became	  more	  frequent	  since	  2008.	  
• The	  level	  of	  support	  in	  capital	  flow	  liberalization	  is	  increasing	  tremendously,	  transferring	   from	   not	   supportive	   to	   partially	   supportive	   or	   even	   fully	  supportive.	  
• Neutral	   cases,	  which	   represent	  no	  attitude	   toward	  capital	   flows	  given	  CFM	  mentioned,	  are	  rare.	  (2002-­‐2004	  Chile,	  2009	  South	  Africa,	  2011	  Venezuela).	  
• The	  level	  of	  support	  is	  more	  relevant	  after	  2010	  when	  the	  IMF	  starts	  its	  New	  Institutional	  View.	  Capital	  controls	  are	  open	  in	  2005	  and	  2012.	  The	  number	  of	  countries	  that	  have	  Article	  IV	  reports	  before	  and	  after	  crisis	  has	  been	  balanced.	  Before	  the	  crisis,	  12.2%	  of	  the	  countries	  observed	  gain	  partial	  support	  for	  capital	   controls	   from	  the	   IMF,	  11.6%	  of	   the	  countries	  observed	  gain	   total	   support,	  while	  after	  the	  crisis	  the	  proportions	  are	  22.3%	  and	  7%	  respectively.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  Supportive	   3	   3	   2	   3	   5	   2	   1	   2	   2	   8	   10	   12	   4	  Neutral	   0	   1	   1	   1	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   1	   1	   0	   0	  Not	  supportive	   5	   3	   3	   2	   0	   4	   2	   4	   2	   2	   1	   0	   0	  
0	  2	  4	  6	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Table	  4	  Correlation	  between	  different	  policy	  suggestions	  Correlation	   Fiscal	  Policy	   Exchange	  Rate	   Sterilization/	  Intervention	   Trade	  Liberalization	   Macro-­‐prudential	  Tighten	  Fiscal	  Policy	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	  Exchange	  Rate	  Flexibility	   0.2395	   1.0000	   	   	   	  Sterilization/Intervention	   0.0531	   0.2788	   1.0000	   	   	  Trade	  Liberalization	   0.1018	   -­‐0.0494	   -­‐0.0774	   1.0000	   	  Tighten	  Macroprudential	   0.2480	   0.2778	   0.2375	   0.0267	   1.0000	  Mention	  of	  CFMs	   0.1131	   0.1909	   0.1971	   0.0820	   0.1981	  	  Table	   4	   reports	   correlation	   coefficients	   among	   different	   types	   of	   IMF	   advice	   on	  capital	   flows.	   	  To	   things	  stand	  out	   that	  our	  relevant	   to	   this	   study.	   	  First,	  Exchange	  rate	   flexibility	   comes	   along	   with	   sterilization/intervention	   in	   the	   FX	   market	   and	  tightening	   prudential	   regulations.	   	   Second,	  mention	   of	   CFMs	   is	  most	   related	  with	  macro	  prudential	  regulation	  policy.	  	  
3.1.2	  Examples	  from	  Reports	  The	  major	   concern	   about	   the	   coding	   process	   is	   the	   difficulty	   to	   narrow	   down	   or	  categorize	   the	   IMF’s	   views	   as	   expressed	   in	   Article	   IV	   reports.	   For	   example,	   the	  report	   might	   make	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   “liberalization	   of	   the	   trade	   and	   exchange	  system,”	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  include	  capital	  account	  liberalization.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   explicit	   reference	   doesn’t	   mean	   that	   the	   IMF	   never	  expressed	  a	  view	  during	  the	  policy	  dialogue	  meeting	  process.	  	  In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  we	  note	  illustrative	  examples	  of	  diagnosis	  and	  support	  that	  were	  coded	  in	  the	  paper.	  	  	  Capital	  Flows	  Mentioned	  as	  an	  Issue:	  	  
• Guatemala	  2006:	  "Money	  and	  credit	  expansion	  has	  been	  rapid	  as	  a	  result	  of	  high	  liquidity	  associated	  with	  strong	  capital	  inflows"(2#3);	  “short-­‐term	  goal	  is	  to	  maintain	  macroeconomic	  stability”	  (13#15).	  	  
• South	  Africa	  2009:	  “The	  global	   financial	  crisis	  of	   late	  2008	  sharply	  changed	  the	   outlook	   for	   an	   already	   slowing	   economy	   and	  posed	  new	   challenges	   for	  macroeconomic	   policies.	   Large	   capital	   outflows,	   triggered	   by	   investor	  withdrawal	   from	   emerging	   market	   assets	   lowered	   stock	   prices	   and	  depreciated	   the	  rand.	  South	  Africa-­‐specific	   factors,	   such	  as	   the	  high	  current	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account	   deficit	   and	   policy	   uncertainties	   created	   by	   the	   upcoming	   national	  elections	   in	  April	   2009,	   also	   contributed	   to	   an	   elevated	   perception	   of	   risk”	  (5#2.1).	  	  
• Colombia	   2010:	   “It	  would	   be	   advisable	   to	   consider	   possible	   responses	   to	   a	  surge	  in	  private	  capital	  inflows”	  (11#16).	  	  
• Republic	   of	   Korea	   2012:	   “Reflecting	   swings	   in	   global	   risk	   aversion,	   capital	  flows	  into	  Korea	  have	  been	  highly	  volatile.	  Following	  the	  August–September	  2011	   spike	   in	   risk	  aversion,	  Korea	  witnessed	  a	   surge	   in	   capital	   outflows	  of	  around	  US$15	  billion	  (including	  outflows	  from	  European	  banks)	  in	  the	  third	  quarter”	  (5#7).	  	  
• Thailand	  2012:	   “In	   line	  with	  other	  emerging	  markets,	   capital	   flows	  became	  markedly	   more	   volatile	   and	   are	   likely	   to	   remain	   so	   in	   the	   near	   future”	  (17#30).	  	  Capital	  Flows	  Not	  Mentioned	  as	  an	  Issue:	  	  
• Guatemala	  2012:	  “Capital	  inflows”	  are	  mentioned	  but	  “vulnerabilities	  remain	  limited”,	   no	   problems	   are	   foreseen	   relating	   to	   capital	   inflows	   or	   outflows	  (2#2).	  	  CAPITAL	  FLOW	  MEASURES	  Mention	  of	  CFMs	  	  
• Thailand	   2010:	   “Relaxed	   regulations	   on	   capital	   outflows:	   The	   Thai	  authorities	   relaxed	   regulations	   for	   domestic	   residents	   to	   invest	   in	   foreign	  securities	   in	   two	   steps,	   first	   in	  August	  2009	  and	   then	   in	  February	  2010,	   to	  encourage	  capital	  outflows	  so	  as	  to	  abate	  the	  upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  baht.	  While	   the	   new	   ceilings	   are	   far	   from	   binding,	   Thai	   investors	   continue	   to	  accumulate	  foreign	  assets,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  measures	  have	  been	  successful”	  (BOX	  2	  p.23).	  	  
• South	  Africa	  2011:	  “Authorities4'	  Views:	  Capital	  Flow	  Measures.	  With	  limited	  scope	  for	  modifying	  the	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  settings	  in	  the	  near	  term	  and	  the	  rand	  on	   the	   strong	   side	  of	   fundamentals,	   there	   is	   arguably	  a	   case	   for	  using	  either	  an	  unremunerated	  reserve	  requirement	  or	  a	  small	  tax	  on	  inflows	  to	  try	  to	  curtail	  inflows	  or	  at	  least	  change	  their	  composition	  (18#28.3);	  As	  for	  CFMs,	  the	   authorities	   agreed	   with	   staffs	   that	   their	   effectiveness	   is	   questionable.	  Moreover,	   they	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	   take	   a	   close	   look	   at	   each	   country’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Authorities	  vary	  in	  different	  emerging	  markets.	  They	  are	  economists	  and	  researchers	  from	  local	  central	  banks	  and	  
economic	  research	  institutes	  as	  well	  as	  professors	  in	  top	  universities.	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circumstances	  in	  deciding	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  CFMs.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  curtailing	  inflows	   while	   the	   country	   is	   also	   relying	   on	   them	   to	   finance	   domestic	  consumption	  and	  investment	  would	  be	  problematic	  (20#29).	  	  	  In	  the	  IMF	  Article	  IV	  reports,	  there	  are	  three	  groups	  of	  authors:	  the	  authorities,	  the	  staffs,	  and	  the	  directors.	  Basically,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  reports	  is	  drafted	  by	  the	  staffs,	  who	   specialize	   in	   one	   emerging	   markets.	   They	   quoted	   authorities’	   views	   from	  economists	   of	   the	   central	   bank	   of	   the	   country	   and	   gave	   detailed	   analysis	   on	  country’s	   economy.	   The	   directors	   gave	   their	   opinions	   on	   policy	   and	   wrote	   the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  reports.	  We	  obtain	  the	  level	  of	  supports	  for	  capital	  controls	  from	  the	   Directors’	   view	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   staffs	   and	   directors	   share	   a	  consistent	  goal	  in	  advising	  the	  country’s	  policy	  decisions.	  This	  assumption	  works	  for	  most	   emerging	  markets	   cases	   with	  minor	   fluctuations	   due	   to	   systemic	   difference	  between	  staffs	  and	  directors.	  	  	  Level	  of	  Support	  for	  Capital	  Controls	  Examples	  of	  Not	  Supportive:	  	  
• Malaysia	   2001:	   “Directors	   also	   welcomed	   the	   recent	   removal	   of	   the	  remaining	  levy	  on	  profit	  repatriation	  of	  portfolio	  capital,	  and	  a	  few	  Directors	  urged	   the	   authorities	   not	   to	   resort	   to	   capital	   controls	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	  deteriorating	  external	  position	  in	  the	  future."	  (p.3,	  PIN)	  	  
• Malaysia	   2003:	   “They	   supported	   the	   authorities'	   approach	   to	   gradually	  liberalize	  the	  remaining	  administrative	  measures	  on	  capital	  flows"	  (p.5,	  PIN)	  	  
• Malaysia	  2011:	  “There	  is	  also	  no	  evident	  need	  for	  capital	  controls	  to	  dampen	  the	  volatility	  of	  flows."	  (7#14)	  	  
• Colombia	  2007:	  “[Capital]	  controls	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effective	  over	  the	  longer	  term	   and	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   government’s	   desire	   to	   deepen	   Colombia’s	  financial	  markets	  through	  the	  increased	  participation	  of	  foreign	  capital.	  The	  staff’s	  preliminary	  assessment	   is	   that	   in	  the	  short	  run,	   the	  controls	  reduced	  portfolio	  inflows	  and	  borrowing”	  (22#34)	  &	  in	  regard	  to	  exchange	  rate,	  “Staff	  welcomes	   the	   relaxation	   of	   capital	   controls	   undertaken	   in	   December,	   and	  recommends	   that	   the	   authorities	   consider	   a	   complete	   phasing	   out	   of	   the	  controls	  in	  the	  near	  term,	  given	  their	  limited	  effectiveness”	  (26#45)	  	  
• Colombia	   2008:	   “The	   controls	   were	   also	   associated	   with	   a	   significant	  increase	  in	  exchange	  rate	  volatility.	  In	  light	  of	  their	  limited	  effectiveness	  and	  adverse	   effects	   on	   volatility	   and	   asset	   market	   development,	   staff	   saw	  significant	  drawbacks	  to	  the	  controls”	  (23#33)	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Examples	  of	  Partially	  supportive:	  	  
• Malaysia	  2002:	  “While	  recognizing	  that	  capital	  controls	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  helping	  Malaysia	  to	  regain	  financial	  stability,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  remaining	  measures	  are	  mainly	  capital	  account	  regulations	  of	  a	  prudential	  nature,	  a	  few	  Directors5	  encouraged	  the	  authorities	  to	  further	  relax	  them.”	  (p.5,	  PIN)	  	  
• South	   Africa	   2005:	   “The	   authorities	   have	   continued	   with	   their	   gradual	  approach	   to	   relaxing	   capital	   controls.	   Staff	   welcomed	   the	   easing	   that	   took	  place	  over	  the	  past	  year,	  including	  the	  removal	  of	  limits	  on	  outward	  foreign	  direct	   investment.	   The	   main	   remaining	   restrictions	   comprise	   limits	   on	  overseas	   investments	   by	   institutional	   investors	   and	   the	   prohibition	   of	  portfolio	  investment	  abroad	  by	  non-­‐financial	  firms.	  The	  authorities	  indicated	  that	   they	  were	   considering	  moving	   from	   exchange	   controls	   to	   a	   system	   of	  prudential	   regulations	   for	   institutional	   investors.	   Staff	   supported	   this	  initiative	  and	  favored	  a	  further	  easing	  of	  restrictions	  on	  non-­‐financial	  firms.	  In	   its	   view,	   all	   these	   measures	   would	   increase	   market	   liquidity	   and	   allow	  greater	  risk	  diversification,	  and	  could	  reduce	  currency	  volatility	  (15#29).	  	  	  
• Chile	  2006:	  “In	  recent	  years,	   the	  domestic	  bond	  market	  has	  grown	  steadily,	  but	   it	   remains	   characterized	   by	   a	   relatively	   low	   level	   of	   activity.	   Staff	  recommended	  that	  liquidity	  be	  improved	  by	  relaxing	  some	  of	  the	  investment	  restrictions	   on	   the	   private	   pension	   funds	   and	   reviewing	   the	   procedures	  surrounding	  the	  taxation	  of	  foreign	  investors.	  Staff	  also	  suggested	  removing	  the	  distortions	  caused	  by	  the	  stamp	  tax	  and	  considering	  introducing	  a	  system	  of	   specialists	   in	   public	   debt	   with	   obligations	   tailored	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  market	  (p.17#30);	  improving	  liquidity	  in	  the	  capital	  market	  is	  a	  priority.	  The	  government	   is	   encouraged	   to	  develop	  a	  medium-­‐term	  public	  debt	   strategy,	  beyond	  the	  political	  cycle,	  and	  decide	  if	  it	  will	  maintain	  a	  presence	  in	  issuing	  bonds.	   Regulations	   are	   needed	   to	   clarify	   exemptions	   from	   capital	   gains	   tax	  for	   foreign	   institutional	   investors.	   This	   may	   help	   enhance	   further	   the	  development	  of	   the	   financial	  sector	  and	  contribute	   to	   internationalizing	  the	  peso.”	  (p.23#44)	  	  
• Thailand	  2008:	  “They	  welcomed	  the	  removal	  of	  capital	  controls,	  providing	  a	  clear	  signal	  of	  the	  authorities'	  intention	  to	  support	  market-­‐friendly	  policies.”	  (EBA#2).	  	  
• Malaysia	   2012:	   “Dealing	   with	   capital	   flows.	   Malaysia	   has	   been	   exposed	   to	  volatile	   capital	   flows,	   and	   this	   is	   likely	   to	   continue	   in	   the	   near	   term.	   The	  policy	   response	   so	   far,	   characterized	   by	   two-­‐way	   exchange	   rate	   flexibility	  while	   smoothing	   excessive	   exchange	   rate	   fluctuations,	   has	   been	   successful.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Directors	  are	  IMF	  policy	  chief	  advisor	  to	  the	  corresponding	  country.	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This	  policy	  should	  continue	  going	  forward,	  and	  could	  be	  complemented	  with	  MPPs	  if	  needed	  to	  mitigate	  potential	  risks.”	  (16#37)	  	  
• Colombia	  2010:	   “Staff	  noted	   that,	   in	  general,	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  controls	   is	  rather	   limited	   as	   a	   permanent	   measure,	   although	   they	   could	   be	   useful	   to	  manage	  a	  temporary	  surge	  in	  capital	  flows”	  (12#16)	  &	  "If	  the	  response	  were	  also	  to	  include	  some	  type	  of	  capital	  controls,	  these	  should	  be	  price-­‐based	  and	  applied	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  transactions".	  (23#37)	  	  
• Colombia	  2011:	   “Staff	   noted	   that	   the	   current	   coverage	  of	  macro	  prudential	  measures	  was	  broad	  and	  adequate	  and	  that	  CFMs	  could	  be	  useful	  as	  part	  of	  a	  transitory	   response	   to	   an	   unexpected	   surge	   in	   inflows.	   Staff	   emphasized,	  however,	  that	  a	  tighter	  fiscal	  stance	  would	  have	  to	  be	  the	  main	  element	  of	  the	  policy	  response	  in	  that	  scenario.”	  (18#19)	  &	  "Staff	  welcomes	  the	  authorities’	  plans	   to	   consider	   other	   policies	   (including	   strengthened	   macro-­‐prudential	  regulations	  and	  capital	  flow	  management	  policies)	  if	  capital	  inflows	  are	  seen	  as	   likely	   to	   endanger	   financial	   stability.	   Staff	   also	   underscores	   that	   a	  tightening	  of	  the	  fiscal	  stance	  would	  have	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  response	  to	  a	  possible	  surge	  in	  capital	  inflows."	  (31#40)	  Examples	  of	  Supportive:	  
• Malaysia	  1999:	  “Directors	  broadly	  agreed	  that	  the	  regime	  of	  capital	  controls-­‐-­‐which	  was	  intended	  by	  the	  authorities	  to	  be	  temporary-­‐-­‐had	  produced	  more	  positive	  results	  than	  many	  observers	  had	  initially	  expected.	  They	  welcomed	  the	   pragmatic	   and	   flexible	   way	   in	   which	   Malaysia	   had	   implemented	   and	  adjusted	  the	  controls."	  (pp.3-­‐4,	  PIN)	  	  
• Turkey	   1999:	   “Directors	   also	   considered	   it	   appropriate	   for	   the	   Central	  Bank...to	   counter	   capital	   inflows	   by	   allowing	   interest	   rates	   to	   fall.	   In	   this	  context,	  Directors	  considered	  the	  proposed	  reduction	  in	  the	  ceiling	  on	  banks’	  net	   open	   foreign	   exchange	   positions	   to	   be	   a	   positive	   step	   that	   would	   help	  curb	  capital	  inflows	  and	  reduce	  banking	  sector	  risk.“	  (p.	  4,	  PIN)	  	  
• Chile	  2000:	  “They	  also	  supported	  the	  proposed	  new	  regulations	  on	  corporate	  governance	  and	  the	  recent	  measures	  to	  liberalize	  capital	  flows,	  citing	  Chile	  as	  exemplifying	  an	  effective	  and	  well-­‐sequenced	  approach	  to	  the	  use	  of	  capital	  controls	  and	  their	  eventual	  replacement	  by	  prudential	  controls”	  (EBA#5).	  	  
• South	   Africa	   2007:	   “The	   authorities	   continue	   to	   relax	   exchange	   controls	  gradually.	   Remaining	   controls	   apply	   to	   capital	   outflows	   by	   residents,	   and	  mainly	  comprise	  limits	  on	  overseas	  investment	  by	  institutional	  investors,	  the	  prohibition	   of	   portfolio	   investment	   abroad	   by	   corporates,	   and	   limits	   on	  offshore	  investment	  by	  individuals.	  Staff	  supported	  the	  relaxation	  of	  controls,	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  better	  allocation	  of	  resources,	  and,	  by	  deepening	  the	  foreign	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exchange	   market,	   could	   help	   reduce	   exchange	   rate	   volatility	   over	   the	  medium	   term.	   Staff	   favored	   simplifying	   the	   administration	   of	   controls—for	  instance,	   replacing	   prior	   authorization	   with	   reporting	   requirements	   for	  investments	  within	  the	  allowed	  limits—to	  reduce	  compliance	  costs	  (13#21).	  	  
• Republic	   of	   Korea	   2012:	   “Despite	   this	   progress,	   Korea	   is	   subject	   to	  substantial	   capital	   flow	   volatility	   given	   the	   large	   size	   and	   openness	   of	   its	  capital	   markets.	   Even	   though	   the	   banking	   system	   vulnerabilities	   have	  diminished	  since	  2008,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remain	  vigilant	  as	  Korea’s	  exposure	  to	   foreign	   banks	   on	   the	   funding	   side	   is	   among	   the	   highest	   in	   Asia…	   A	  potential	   deterioration	   of	   conditions	   in	   parent	   banks’	   jurisdictions	   may	  create	   funding	   difficulties	   in	   foreign	   bank	   branches,	   which	  will	   need	   to	   be	  monitored	  closely”	  (13#30).	  	  
3.1.3	  Comparison	  between	  Regions	  The	   evolution	   of	   level	   of	   support	   for	   capital	   controls	   varies	   by	   region.	   Country	  heterogeneity	  affects	  our	  model	  and	  causes	  variation	  in	  the	  results.	  These	  countries	  differ	  in	  geographical	  regions,	  income	  levels,	  macroeconomic	  fundamentals,	  political	  context,	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  country	  and	  so	  on.	  However,	  we	  notice	  that	  the	  general	  tendency	   is	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   level	   of	   support	   over	   years.	   To	   see	   the	   regional	  heterogeneity,	  we	  carry	  a	  regional	  analysis	  of	  the	  change	  in	  level	  of	  support	  over	  the	  years	  in	  depth.	  Furthermore,	  we	  compare	  the	  mean	  and	  quarters	  before	  and	  after	  the	  crisis	  among	  different	  regions.	  All	  variables	  are	  significantly	  different	  before	  and	  after	  the	  crisis	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   trade	   liberalization.	   Moreover,	   in	   general	   all	   variables	   are	  significantly	   different	   at	   the	   1%	   level.	   It	   would	   be	   very	   interesting	   in	   further	  research	  to	  analyze	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  changes	  in	  different	  regions.	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Figure	   6	   shows	   the	   general	   distribution	   of	   level	   of	   support	   among	   different	  emerging	  markets.	  The	  box	  boundary	  represents	  the	  25	  quantiles	  and	  75	  quantiles.	  The	   lines	   are	   the	   25%,	   50%	   and	   75%	   of	   the	   distribution	   with	   maximum	   and	  minimum	  value	  points.	   For	   emerging	  Asia,	   there	   is	   a	   significant	   spread	   in	   level	   of	  support	  after	  the	  crises.	  Emerging	  Europe	  has	  a	  significant	  shift	  from	  not	  supportive	  to	   fully	   supportive.	  Emerging	  Latin	  America	  markets	   are	   comparatively	  persistent	  on	   capital	   flow	   liberalization.	   Emerging	   others	   has	   mixed	   issues.	   All	   emerging	  markets	  receive	  more	  volatile	  level	  of	  support	  on	  capital	  flows	  from	  IMF.	  We	   see	   that	   the	   IMF	   strengthens	   support	   for	   partial	   control	   of	   capital	   account	  significantly	  after	  the	  crisis.	  There	  is	  no	  substantial	  adjustment	  on	  the	  level	  for	  not	  supportive,	   neutral	   and	   totally	   supportive.	  However,	  without	   controlling	   for	   other	  vulnerability	   indices,	   it	   is	  not	  safe	   to	  claim	  that	   the	   financial	  crisis	  alters	   the	  IMF’s	  support	   level	   for	   capital	   control.	   It	   is	   highly	   likely	   that	   the	   IMF	   changes	   its	   policy	  recommendation	   for	   capital	   controls	   based	   on	   the	   four	   vulnerability	   indices	   we	  introduced.	  	  Figure	  7	  gives	  a	  frequency	  graph	  of	  the	  levels	  of	  support.	  Here	  “zero”	  	  case	  not	  only	  includes	  a	  neutral	  attitude	  towards	  the	  level	  of	  support	  in	  capital	  controls,	  but	  also	  accounts	  or	  the	  cases	  of	  not	  mentioning	  CFMs	  as	  well	  as	  capital	  flow	  not	  diagnosed	  as	  an	  issue.	  We	  see	  a	  larger	  proportion	  of	  capital	  flow	  unclearness	  in	  the	  emerging	  Latin	   American	   and	   Caribbean.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   emerging	   Asia	   has	   the	   highest	  frequencies	  in	  both	  not	  supportive	  and	  supportive	  categories.	  	  
Figure	  7	  Statistics	  of	  Level	  of	  Support	  by	  Region	  Including	  All	  Observations	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4.	  	  Regression	  results	  
4.1	  Baseline	  model	  	  We	   first	   run	   the	   simple	   regression	   of	   IMF	   Initial	  Diagnosis	   on	   the	   Financial	   Crisis	  Dummy	   variable.	   Results	   are	   summarized	   in	   Table	   5	   Panel	   1.	   When	   we	   run	   the	  simple	  regression	  of	  IMF	  Initial	  Diagnosis	  on	  dummy	  variable,	  we	  obtain	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  coefficient	   for	   the	  dummy	  variable.	  Without	  control	   for	  other	  variables,	  there	  is	  a	  statistically	  significant	  change	  in	  IMF	  Initial	  Diagnosis	  due	  to	  the	  2007-­‐2008	  Financial	  Crisis.	  However,	   the	  conclusion	  we	  have	  reached	  by	   just	  running	  the	  previous	  regression	  doesn’t	  control	  for	  any	  other	  variable	  that	  could	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  “Dummy”.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  it	  is	  not	  due	  to	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  itself	  but	  to	  other	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  economic	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  emerging	  markets.	  Therefore,	  to	  further	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Crises	  and	  IMF	  Initial	  Diagnosis	  we	  run	  further	  regressions.	  As	   shown	   in	  Table	  5,	   even	   if	  we	  control	   for	  macro	   fundamentals,	  which	  measures	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  the	  economy,	  into	  the	  regression,	  the	  dummy	  variable	  always	  has	  a	  statistically	  significant	  and	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  IMF	  initial	  diagnosis.	  	  We	  plot	  the	  baseline	  regression	  model	  of	  the	  level	  of	  support	  of	  capital	  controls	  for	  different	   regions	   in	   Figure	   8.	   There	   are	   positive	   trends	   for	   emerging	   Asia	   and	  Europe.	  The	  grey	  area	  represents	  the	  90%	  confidence	  interval	  for	  the	  slope.	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4.2	  Including	  Capital	  Vulnerability	  Measures	  Our	  modification	   of	   the	   baseline	   model	   includes	   adding	   current	   account	   balance,	  domestic	  banking	  sector	  credit	  and	  external	  debt	  payment	  ratio	  separately	  as	  well	  as	   capital	   vulnerability	  measures.	   Capital	   vulnerability	  measure	   is	   generated	   from	  the	  combination	  of	  three	  variables	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  sector.	  First,	   IMF’s	   initial	   diagnosis	   changes	   significantly	   after	   the	   2007	   financial	   crises,	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  around	  20%	  on	  the	  cross-­‐border	  capital	  flow	  issues.	  There	  is	  no	  significant	   impact	   from	   the	   current	   account	   balance,	   domestic	   banking	   credit	   and	  external	  debt,	  neither	  separate	  nor	  simultaneous.	  	  Second,	   mention	   of	   CFMs	   is	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   the	   domestic	   banking-­‐sector	   credit:	   the	   higher	   the	   credit	   is,	   the	  more	   vulnerable	   the	   domestic	   banking	  sector	   is,	   therefore	   the	   more	   mention	   of	   CFMs	   as	   a	   warning	   advice.	   The	   Capital	  Vulnerability	  Measure	  generated	  from	  the	  three	  variables	  has	  a	  significant	  positive	  coefficient,	   meaning	   the	   more	   vulnerable	   the	   emerging	   market	   is,	   the	   higher	  probability	  (50%	  increases)	  of	  mentioning	  CFMs.	  	  Third,	   level	   of	   support	   on	   capital	   flow	   liberalization	   changes	   after	   the	   crises,	  with	  more	   supportive	   arguments	   mentioned	   in	   the	   Article	   IV.	   The	   more	   severe	   the	  current	  account	  deficit	  (negative	  balance),	  the	  less	  supportive	  IMF	  is	  on	  capital	  flow	  liberalization.	  What’s	  more,	  for	  the	  domestic	  credit	  from	  the	  banking	  sector,	  a	  high	  value	  of	  domestic	  credit	  implies	  a	  high	  development	  in	  capital	  market	  together	  with	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  capital	  vulnerability.	   In	  2013,	   the	  country	  with	   the	  highest	  domestic	  credit	   in	   the	  world	   is	   Japan	  with	   a	   value	   of	   341.69	  while	   the	   lowest	   value	   in	   the	  world	  is	  Libya	  -­‐65.93.	  We	  find	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  domestic	  credit	  and	  mention	   of	   CFMs	   because	   a	   boom	   in	   banking	   credit	   makes	   IMF	   realize	   that	   the	  country	  needs	   to	   restrict	   inflows.	   IMF	   is	  more	   cautious	   to	   the	   capital	   flows	   in	   the	  emerging	  markets,	  valuing	  domestic	  credit	  as	  a	  signal	  of	  economy’s	  vulnerability.	  	  Taking	  one	  step	  further,	  we	  generate	  Capital	  Vulnerability	  Measures	  from	  previous	  results	  and	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  general	  control	  variable	  of	  the	  economy’s	  vulnerability.	  In	  the	  final	  regression,	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  emerging	   market	   and	   the	   supportive	   attitude	   of	   IMF.	   The	   more	   vulnerable	   the	  current	   economy	   is,	   the	   more	   changes	   in	   IMF’s	   level	   of	   support	   on	   capital	   flows	  management	  measures.	  These	  changes	  can	  be	  from	  not	  supportive	  to	  neutral,	  from	  neutral	  to	  partially	  supportive,	  or	  from	  partially	  supportive	  to	  fully	  supportive.	  The	  R—squares	  of	  our	  regression	  models	  are	  low	  because	  our	  sample	  is	  relatively	  small	  and	  has	  a	  short	  time	  horizon	  of	  12	  years.	  By	  adding	  more	  control	  variables,	  we	  see	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  model’s	   goodness	   to	   fit.	   There	   are	   two	   kinds	   of	   effects	   by	  including	  more	  control	  variables:	  on	  one	  hand,	   it	   lowers	   the	  degree	  of	   freedom	  of	  the	  model;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  avoids	  the	  model	  misspecification	  and	  improves	  the	  model	  explanation.	  More	  observations	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  better	  explain	  the	  effects	  of	  financial	  crises	  on	  IMF’s	  view	  of	  capital	  flows.	  
	  
	  
	   27	  
4.3	  Including	  Financial	  Openness	  alone	  Table	   6	   shows	   the	   results	   of	   adding	   financial	   openness	   alone	   in	   the	   regression	  model.	   When	   using	   Chin-­‐Ito	   Capital	   Openness	   as	   the	   control	   variable	   of	   the	  underlying	   economic	   fundamentals,	   there	   is	   a	   significant	   negative	   effect	   on	   both	  IMF’s	   initial	   diagnosis	   and	  mention	  of	  CFMs.	  The	   coefficient	   can	  be	   interpreted	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  capital	  openness:	  the	  higher	  level	  of	  openness	  the	  current	  emerging	  market	  is,	  the	  less	  probability	  it’s	  diagnosed	  by	  IMF	  with	  a	  capital	  flow	  issue	  and	  the	  less	  mention	  of	  CFMs	  in	  the	  IMF	  Article	  IV	  report	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  
4.4	  Adding	  intersections	  Beyond	  our	  baseline	  model,	  we	  generate	  five	  intersection	  variables	  by	  multiplying	  the	  controls	  with	  the	  crises	  dummy.	  There	  are	  dummycurrentbalance,	  
dummydomesticcredit,	  dummyexternaldebt,	  dummyfinancialopenness	  and	  
CCompositeindex.	  CCompositeindex	  is	  based	  on	  Capital	  Vulnerability	  Measures	  we	  created,	  which	  is	  the	  equally	  weighted	  composite	  index	  of	  current	  account	  balance,	  external	  debt	  and	  domestic	  banking-­‐sector	  credit.	  By	  adding	  these	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒×𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	  Variables,	  we	  expect	  IMF	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  respond	  to	  specific	  economic	  indicators	  with	  a	  capital	  flow	  diagnosis,	  CFM	  mention	  as	  well	  as	  support	  for	  capital	  controls	  after	  the	  2008	  crises.	  There	  should	  be	  a	  positive	  significant	  coefficient	  for	  the	  intersection	  variables.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  adding	  the	  intersection	  parts	  is	  to	  find	  out	  how	  IMF	  makes	  changes	  and	  adjustments	  in	  capital	  flow	  regulations	  after	  the	  2008	  financial	  crises.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  shown	  in	  our	  quantitative	  analysis,	  IMF	  does	  change	  its	  level	  of	  support	  to	  CFMs	  after	  the	  crises.	  But	  what	  are	  the	  key	  factors	  IMF’s	  changes	  in	  its	  initial	  diagnosis,	  mention	  of	  CFMs	  and	  level	  of	  supports	  are	  based	  on?	  Which	  macro	  indicators	  influence	  IMF’s	  change	  most	  after	  the	  crises?	  Are	  the	  changes	  in	  different	  decisions	  affects	  by	  the	  same	  factor	  significantly	  and	  consistently?	  	  	  The	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  table	  7.	  There	  are	  some	  interesting	  results	  we	  found	  through	  tens	  of	  regressions	  we	  run.	  Most	  regressions	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  not	  significant.	  However,	  there	  are	  improvements	  in	  the	  model’s	  goodness	  to	  fit	  and	  some	  of	  the	  results	  come	  out	  to	  be	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  our	  expectation.	  	  We	  found	  significant	  positive	  response	  in	  the	  financial	  openness	  index	  to	  IMF’s	  initial	  diagnosis	  after	  2008	  and	  negative	  for	  the	  level	  of	  support.	  There	  are	  more	  IMF	  initial	  diagnoses	  after	  the	  crises,	  which,	  with	  a	  higher	  probability,	  is	  due	  to	  the	  financial	  openness	  of	  the	  emerging	  markets.	  IMF’s	  judgment	  on	  capital	  flows	  issues	  is	  mostly	  based	  on	  countries’	  financial	  openness.	  However,	  the	  mention	  of	  CFMs	  is	  more	  related	  to	  the	  current	  account	  balance.	  Both	  the	  external	  debt	  and	  financial	  openness	  have	  negative	  influence	  on	  IMF’s	  levels	  of	  support	  to	  CFMs,	  which	  means	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IMF	  considers	  external	  debt	  and	  financial	  openness	  when	  giving	  opinions	  on	  the	  policy	  support.	  For	  mention	  of	  CFMs,	  the	  current	  account	  balance	  matters	  more	  for	  such	  changes.	  External	  debt	  has	  a	  significantly	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  support	  changes	  after	  the	  crises.	  The	  measure	  of	  capital	  vulnerability	  matters	  more	  for	  the	  IMF	  initial	  diagnosis	  after	  the	  crises	  In	  fact,	  our	  capital	  vulnerability	  measure	  turns	  out	  to	  offer	  a	  relatively	  consistent	  result,	  the	  same	  as	  what	  we	  expected	  in	  the	  beginning.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  regression	  results	  are	  not	  significant	  from	  zero	  and	  hard	  to	  tell	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  coefficients.	  
4.5	  Findings	  and	  Robustness	  We	  can	  conclude	  from	  the	  regression	  results	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  has	  a	  significant	  influence	   on	   the	   IMF’s	   decision	   about	   level	   of	   support	   for	   capital	   control	   after	  controlling	   for	   the	   vulnerability	   measures	   individually.	   Domestic	   credit	   in	   the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  CVM	  index	  both	  alter	  IMF’s	  support	  level	  for	  capital	  control	  significantly	  in	  the	  expected	  direction.	  The	  positive	  coefficient	  indicates	  that	  as	  the	  economy	   becomes	   more	   vulnerable,	   the	   level	   of	   support	   for	   capital	   control	  increases.	  	  	  The	   result	   is	   especially	  meaningful	   for	  emerging	  market	  economies	   in	  Asia,	  which	  are	  mostly	  under	  development	  with	  credit	  issues	  in	  the	  banking	  sector.	  Capital	  flows	  can	   be	   associated	   with	   the	   domestic	   intermediary	   sectors	   such	   as	   banking.	   In	  particular,	   positive	   net	   flows	   can	   be	   used	   to	   finance	   current	   account	   deficits.	   In	  August	  2013,	  India	  announced	  a	  new	  capital	  control	  to	  stop	  the	  cash	  flowing	  out	  of	  the	  country	  and	  to	  stem	  the	  decline	  of	  rupee.	  Since	  our	  regression	  results	  show	  that	  IMF	   has	   altered	   its	   policy	   recommendation	   after	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   India’s	  imposition	  of	  the	  capital	  control	  should	  have	  gained	  support	  from	  IMF.	  	  The	   coefficient	   on	   capital	   vulnerability	   measure	   CVM	   is	   positive	   and	   significant,	  indicating	  that	  the	  openness	  of	  a	  country’s	  capital	  account	  does	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  IMF’s	  altitude	  about	  capital	  control.	  However,	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Chinn-­‐Ito	  index	  is	  just	  one	  method	  to	  describe	  certain	  facets	  of	  a	  country’s	  capital	  account,	  we	  cannot	   say	   that	   in	   reality	   the	   openness	   of	   a	   country’s	   capital	   account	   has	   no	  influence	  on	  IMF’s	  policy	  recommendation.	  	  The	   coefficient	   on	   vulnerability	   index	   “Current	   account	   balance”	   is	   negative	   but	  insignificant,	   which	   implies	   that	   we	   cannot	   reject	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   current	  account	   balance	   does	   not	   alter	   the	   IMF’s	   attitude	   about	   capital	   controls.	   The	  coefficient	   on	   vulnerability	   index	   “External	   Debt	   Payment”	   is	   negative	   but	  insignificant,	  which	  implies	  that	  we	  cannot	  reject	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  country	  to	  repay	  its	  debt	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  IMF’s	  attitude	  about	  capital	  controls.	  	  The	  interesting	  result	  is	  that	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  domestic	  banking-­‐sector	  credit	  is	  negative	   and	   significant,	  which	  means	   that	   the	   domestic	   credit	   of	   a	   country	   in	   its	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banking	  sector	  alters	  the	  IMF’s	  attitude	  about	  capital	  controls	  after	  the	  crisis.	  After	  the	  crisis,	  as	  the	  domestic	  banking	  credit	  evaluated	  by	  World	  Bank	  strengthens,	  the	  IMF	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  increase	  its	  level	  of	  support	  for	  capital	  controls.	  Our	  results	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows.	  	  
• The	  financial	  crises	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  IMF	  diagnosis	  of	  whether	  capital	  flows	  are	  a	  source	  of	  vulnerability	  in	  emerging	  markets.	  	  This	  finding	  is	  irrespective	  of	  the	  level	  actual	  capital	  flow	  vulnerability	  in	  specific	  economies	  however	  and	  thus	  signals	  an	  ideational	  change.	  22.9%	  of	  more	  capital	  flow	  diagnosis	  appears	  after	  the	  crises.	  	  
• The	  IMF	  is	  more	  apt	  to	  outrightly	  discuss	  CFMs	  after	  the	  crises,	  especially	  when	  domestic	  banking	  sector	  credit	  appears	  to	  be	  concerning.	  By	  controlling	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  effect	  of	  crises	  becomes	  insignificant.	  Our	  capital	  vulnerability	  index	  has	  a	  significant	  prediction	  of	  IMF	  mention	  of	  CFMs.	  	  
• The	  IMF	  is	  more	  apt	  to	  support	  the	  use	  of	  CFMs	  after	  the	  crisis,	  however	  the	  level	  of	  support	  changes	  after	  the	  crises	  becomes	  less	  significant	  when	  adding	  vulnerability	  controls.	  The	  more	  vulnerable	  the	  emerging	  market	  is,	  the	  more	  level	  of	  support	  on	  capital	  flow	  management	  measures	  are	  imposed.	  	  Thus	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  financial	  crises	  changed	  the	  pattern	  of	  IMF	  attitudes	  on	  capital	  flow	  policies.	  The	  macro	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  economy	  also	  influences	  IMF	  view	  on	  capital	  controls,	  especially	  domestic	  banking-­‐sector	  credit.	  The	  capital	  vulnerability	  index	  significantly	  affects	  the	  CFMs	  suggestions	  and	  IMF	  level	  of	  support.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  link	  between	  the	  crisis	  and	  IMF	  support	  begins	  to	  weaken	  the	  more	  that	  macroeconomic	  control	  variables	  that	  are	  introduced	  into	  the	  model.	  The	  results	  are	  robust	  and	  consistent	  under	  several	  modifications	  from	  the	  baseline	  model.	  Adding	   intersections	   and	  more	   controls	   improves	   the	  model’s	   goodness	   to	  fit.	   The	   main	   results	   don’t	   change	   and	   the	   corresponding	   coefficients	   remain	  significantly	  positive.	  The	  joint	  endogenous	  relationship	  between	  CFM	  mention	  and	  levels	   of	   support	   enhances	   the	   IMF	   institutional	   view	   changes	   after	   the	   Global	  Financial	  Crises.	  Our	  results	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  further	  research	  on	  what	  factors	  the	  good	   indicators	   of	   IMF	   changes	   are	   and	   seeking	   the	  underlying	   economic	   reasons	  for	  emerging	  market	  growth.	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5.	  Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  This	  paper	  sought	  to	  add	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  capital	  account	  by	  econometrically	  testing	  whether	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  linked	  to	  a	  change	  in	  IMF	  policy	  advice	  on	  these	  matters.	  	  The	  IMF	  underwent	  a	  significant	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  its	  policy	  on	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  and	  the	  role	  of	  capital	  controls	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Previous	  work	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  shift	  in	  thinking	  at	  the	  IMF,	  albeit	  an	  incremental	  one,	  was	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  (Chwieroth,	  2012;	  Gallagher,	  2014).	  	  This	  paper	  adds	  to	  that	  literature	  and	  finds	  that	  not	  only	  has	  the	  IMF	  changed	  what	  its	  view	  on	  capital	  flows,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  the	  IMF	  has	  also	  changed	  its	  actual	  behavior	  on	  these	  matters	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  	  This	  paper	  is	  not	  the	  last	  word	  on	  these	  matters.	  	  Our	  database	  will	  need	  to	  be	  updated	  on	  an	  annual	  or	  semi-­‐annual	  basis.	  	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  IMF	  view	  remains	  a	  significant	  component	  of	  IMF	  advice	  as	  the	  ‘salience’	  of	  the	  crisis	  wanes	  in	  future	  years.	  	  Pagliari	  (2013)	  has	  shown	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  tend	  to	  be	  most	  attune	  to	  regulations	  during	  and	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  crises	  but	  that	  such	  attention	  decreases	  as	  the	  public	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  move	  on	  to	  other	  concerns.	  	  What	  is	  more,	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  additional	  coding	  could	  be	  done	  to	  expand	  the	  set	  of	  independent	  variables	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  IMF	  policy	  on	  capital	  flows.	  	  A	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  coded	  the	  training	  of	  IMF	  employees	  and	  economists	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  ideas	  and	  beliefs	  of	  staff	  are	  reflected	  in	  policy	  (Chwieroth,	  2009;	  Ban,	  2013).	  	  Adding	  analyses	  such	  as	  those	  may	  shed	  further	  insight	  into	  these	  dynamics	  as	  well.	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